This paper explores the change in the level of competition in rural banking markets since the deregulation that occurred following passage of the Riegle Neal Act of 1994. Using an empirical model that utilizes both the number of banks and the value of deposits in a cross-section of rural markets, we decompose the impact of the entry of new banks into resulting changes in per capita demand and the costs/profits of local banks in both 1994 and 2004. We conclude that the banking market is more competitive today despite the fact that the number of banks may have declined; on average fewer banks are now needed to make rural banking markets competitive than were needed in 1994.
Introduction
The 1994 Riegle Neal Act ushered forth a new era in banking deregulation. As and 2004. We conclude that the banking market is more competitive today; on average fewer banks are need to make rural banking markets "competitive" today than were needed in 1994.
Literature Review
There is a long empirical literature on entry -both determinants and effectsusually based on manufacturing industry data. Early banking entry papers include Hanweck (1971) and Rose (1977) . More recently, Amel and Liang (1997) present interesting results on bank entry fairly closely related to this paper's focus. They jointly explain bank profits and entry over the 1977-88 period for about 2,000 rural counties and about 300 urban markets (metropolitan statistical areas), and find that supranormal profits promote entry as does population and population growth, and that entry has the anticipated pro-competitive effect of reducing profits -though only in rural markets.
Most of the previous studies looked at bank entry in the pre-Riegle-Neal Act (banking deregulation) period. However, since then Berger et al (2004) , Seelig and Critchfield (2003) , and Keeton (2000) have all found -though with somewhat differing definitions of merger activity and samples -that merger activity generally tends to promote de novo entry. These findings are consistent with merger activity and/or the presence of "big banks" in a market as signaling to potential entrants the opportunities for supranormal profits to be earned.
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Others have recently studied market dynamics in local banking markets. Both Dick (2007) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2007b) find that the incumbent banks in markets tend to expand via new branches to aid in deterring new entry when demand grows.
Similarly, find that early entrants in banking markets seem to be able to entrench their positions and have persistently higher market shares.
The work by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) stimulated a wave of empirical research on entry. They explain entry in terms of the cross-sectional response to market size and interpret an increasing population to firm ratio as a strengthening of competition (requiring more competitive pricing); in other words, the fact that larger sales are required to offset the fixed costs of entry implies more competitive pricing. A discrete choice model relates these "entry thresholds" and how they change with subsequent entry to predictions about price behavior associated with increasing numbers of firms. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) take the view that isolated rural markets are best suited to testing hypotheses regarding entry, generally because of the difficulty in accurately drawing market boundaries in metropolitan areas or even in rural counties adjacent to MSAs. Cetorelli (2002) uses the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) (BR) methodology to examine local banking markets and explain (equilibrium) market structure by population and other county economic characteristics; the paper analyzes numbers of banks in a large sample of non-metropolitan counties for 1999. While we would argue that contiguous rural counties may not represent the most appropriate geographic market definition for local banking, based on his estimated ordered probit coefficients, significant market power is suggested at least until the number of banks in a county reaches five in number. to examine the nature of competition within and across three types of institutions -multimarket banks, single-market banks, and thrifts. As in this paper, they choose to define markets in terms of BLS "labor market areas" which combines contiguous counties depending on commuting patterns to better proxy geographical markets for financial services. Cohen and Mazzeo (2007a) find significant product differentiation (that competition within types is more aggressive than across types) and that variable profits are significantly reduced by the second firm in a given type, this reduction becoming smaller for subsequent entry.
We also use a variant of the BR approach. However, unlike Cetorelli (2002) we consider only rural counties at least one county removed from an MSA and not adjacent to any other sample county. We also consider the issue of banking competition in small rural markets in a somewhat different manner than Cetorelli (2002) and Cohen and Mazzeo (2007a) , applying the methodology of Abraham et al (2007) which attempts to sort out the roles of increased competition and changes in fixed costs as the number of firms in a market increases. 
Descriptive Statistics
The data sources used are the FDIC's Summary of Deposits Data, and the Federal Reserve System's National Information System, along with Census population, land area and retail sales estimates, and BEA personal income and wage estimates. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on the sample of 115 non-metropolitan BLS "labor market areas" (LMAs) for 1994 and 2004. 5 Initially, counties -no more than three from any one state --were chosen from all those at least one county away from a metropolitan statistical area and not adjacent to another in the sample. Some of these were then combined with one or two adjacent counties to correspond to the BLS labor market areas.
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The limit on the number of markets chosen per state was designed to ensure a broad geographic balance in the sample; the alternative -including all rural counties (as in Cetorelli (2002)) or all small rural labor market areas (as in Cohen and Mazzeo (2007a,b) ) --can lead to a disproportionate weighting on a small number of primarily rural states. 7 The choice of rural markets somewhat isolated from metropolitan areas (and from each other) was designed, as discussed in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) , to allow for more accurate measurement of market entry. and 18; 9 while certainly distinctions remain, we consider both banks and thrifts as "banking institutions" and do not (as do Cohen and Mazzeo) address the issue of how closely competitive they are. 10 We do, however, consider credit unions as a competitive threat to both banks and thrifts, especially in small rural markets (and include a credit union variable as a demand shifter).
The average population per bank/thrift is only about 5,000. The data suggest surprisingly low thresholds for multiple banks and thrifts --only below populations of around 2,300 does monopoly banking seem the norm. Five of the six markets with mean populations of 2,300 or less over the 1994-2004 period had monopoly banks or thrifts both years. 11 In contrast, of the 21 somewhat larger markets up to 10,000 in population, only 3 had monopoly banks in any of the three years. At the other end of the spectrum there are four relatively large markets which may be outliers in the sample, two in Hawaii, one in South Carolina, and one in California -all with at least 115,000 in population all three sample years, while the next largest is more than 20,000 smaller.
However, results are not sensitive to the inclusion of both these very large and the very smallest rural markets.
In order to implement the Abraham et al methodology, a measure of output is needed; we choose bank/thrift deposits as this variable. While, on the one hand, this may be viewed as an input into (part of) what banks are selling -loans, on the other hand, to the extent we view the output of banks as a bundle of services (one of which is providing a depository role), this seems not a bad proxy.
Methodology
As noted above, we utilize an econometric model derived in Abraham, et. al. (2007) . In the following paragraphs, we provide a brief outline of the model.
The market demand for banking services is defined by the equation
where per capita demand, d(P,X), is a function of price and exogenous demand shifters We observe the number of banks (N) and the quantity of deposits (Q) for each market. A bank will enter the local market only if it can earn non-negative profits. The N th firm in the market earns profits equal to:
The total quantity of deposits in the market is equal to:
Following Abraham, et. al. (2007) , we utilize the following specifications:
In these equations the parameters δ N, α N , and γ N are coefficients on dummy variables for the market structure, or the number of banks in the market. They capture the differences in per capita quantity, average variable profit margins and fixed costs between markets with one firm and markets with N firms.
Substituting equations [4]-[7] into equation [2]
, we find that the N th firm will enter when:
Denote µ x = δ x + α x , µ w = δ w + α w -γ w , and µ N = γ N -α N + ln(N) -δ N . Furthermore, allow ε π to equal the sum of the error terms in equation [8] . Because the number of firms will be the max {N:Π n >0}, we can rewrite the empirical model as: 
If ε π is normally distributed, then equation The errors in the ordered probit and quantity equations are highly correlated.
Therefore, we assume a variance components model in which:
where ρ is the degree of correlation between the entry equation and quantity equation.
We assume that v π and v Q are independently and normally distributed with means of zero and standard deviations of σ π and σ Q , respectively. Furthermore, we assume that η is independent of both v π and v Q , and is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ η .
The model is estimated using maximum simulated likelihood. Guassian quadrature techniques are utilized to integrate the likelihood function over the distribution of η . To identify the selection model inherent in the entry equation, we include the state-level regulatory climate (as of 1994) and the physical size of the market, which we expect to affect fixed costs of entry but not variable profits or demand.
Econometric Results and Interpretation
As noted earlier, we consider two time periods in our analysis: (1) 1994, when state-level regulation was still likely to be a major determinant of entry patterns, and potential competition from entry was likely to be less significant; and (2) 2004, when --a decade past the Riegle-Neal Act --bank branching and entry were virtually unregulated and one might expect to see more competition resulting in local markets.
As listed in Table 1 , we include a number of potential demand shifters in the model, including income per capita, retail activity (retail sales per capita), and the presence of competition from local credit unions. We include the average wage in the market as a potential cost shifter. We expect fixed costs to increase with the physical size of the market (land area). Intuitively, the cost of serving the market may increase with the physical size as banks are forced to invest in more branches. As noted above, the final explanatory variable we include is a measure of the regulatory environment of the state, which we view as a proxy for fixed costs of entry, but not affecting quantity demanded or variable profits. 13 Results from the maximum likelihood estimation of the model are included in Table 2 .
As expected, the parameter estimates associated with market population are Table 2 in the per capita quantity (δ) section.
The single variable cost shifter included in the model, average wage, has the expected negative impact on per capita quantity in both years, with a one percent increase in the average wage raising prices and, thus, decreasing per capita quantity by just over one percent. Two of the primary demand shifters, income and retail sales per capita, have significant positive impact on per capita demand in both years. As one might expect, as income levels and retail activity in a market increase so do the per capita quantity of bank deposits. Tables 3 and 4 analyze the market structure dummies by calculating entry threshold ratios and the per firm population thresholds, respectively. The threshold ratios from the 1994 sub-sample suggest that the third firm requires about 60 percent more per firm population than the second to be profitable, and the fourth firm requires a 50 percent increase in per firm population when compared to the third. The 5/4 and 6/5 thresholds continue to decrease and reach closer to one (though with a little turbulence along the way), suggesting that the market is becoming more competitive.
If one assumes that fixed costs are constant in the number of firms in the market, the reduction in the threshold ratio suggest that competition is pushing prices lower and lower, with the market reaching closer to a competitive equilibrium. However, banks (in markets at mean values of all explanatory variables) continue to have market power at least through the entry of the seventh bank. The benefit of the Abraham et. al. method is that we do not have to assume that fixed costs are constant in the number of firms that enter the market, thus providing a more accurate depiction of the level of competition in the market place. Note that the decreasing thresholds that we found in 1994 could be because even though there were no changes in the competitive conditions as firms entered the market, the fixed costs increase with the number of banks in the market at a decreasing rate. Similarly, the fluctuating threshold ratios we found in 2004 could be due to interactions between the rate that fixed costs increase and the rate at which markets reach a competitive equilibrium. by an additional 13 to 16 percent with the entrance of the fourth and fifth firm, and by the sixth firm only increases about three percent. At the same time, the decomposition indicates that entrants are decreasing average variable profits as a fraction of fixed costs.
These effects are consistent with modest reductions in price, thus suggesting that competition is increasing up until the entry of the sixth firm.
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The effects for 2004 initially suggest that with deregulation, potential competition has disciplined markets such that 2-firm markets are reasonably competitive -entry of a 3 rd has no substantial impact on per capita demand (or price). The 23 percent increase in per capita demand predicted from the entry of a 4 th firm seems to be an anomaly, especially as the 5 th firm again has no significant impact on per capita demand. It must be acknowledged that our confidence in the local market definition for banking markets is stronger for 1994 than for 2004, as large internet banks began to make inroads into deposit-taking by then. 15 The greater increase in per capita demand (of 15%) associated with the 7 th firm is hard to explain and may reflect differences we were unable to control for between the smaller and larger of our markets.
Conclusion
Other work has examined determinants of entry in local banking markets. In this paper we apply to this sector a promising new extension to the Bresnahan/Reiss 
